State v. Kling Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 37322 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
5-21-2010
State v. Kling Respondent's Brief Dckt. 37322
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Kling Respondent's Brief Dckt. 37322" (2010). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2383.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2383
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE ) 
SUSPENSION 01: MATILDA K. KLING, ) 
Supreme Court No. 37322 









Appeal from the District Court of the 
Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Blaine 
HONORABLE R. TED ISRAEL, Magistrate Judge 
HONORABLE ROBERT J. ELGEE, District Judge 
Lawrence G. Wasden Brian E. Elkins, P.C. 
Attorney General Attorney at Law 
State of Idaho P. 0 .  Box 766 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Stephen A. Bywater 208-726-4338 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
208-334-4534 
Attorneys for Attorney for 
PlaintifflAppellant/Cross-Respondent DefendantlRespondentiCross- Appellant 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TI-IE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN THE MATTER OF TI-IE LICENSE ) 
SUSPENSION OF MATILDA K. KLING, ) 
1 Supreme Court No. 37322 








Appeal from the District Court of the 
Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Blaine 
HONORABLE R. TED ISRAEL, Magistrate Judge 
HONORABLE ROBERT J. ELGEE, District Judge 
Lawrence G. Wasden Brian E. Elkins, P.C. 
Attorney General Attorney at Law 
State of Idaho P. 0. Box 766 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Stephen A. Bywater 208-726-4338 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
208-334-4534 
Attorneys for Attorney for 
Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Respondent DefendantIRespondentlCross- Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ii 
I. STATEMENTOFTHECASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 
B. THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGSIN THE TRIAL COURT 
AND ITS DISPOSITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4 
I ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5 
A. WHETHER THE NOS FORM IS AMBIGUOUS AS APPLIED TO 
OUT-OF-STATE LICENSED DRIVERS AND VIOLATES THE STATUTE 
AND DUE PROCESS GUARANTEES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 5  
B. WHETHER, O N A  BAC REFUSAL PROCEEDING, THE ARRESTING 
OFFlCER SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO FILE ANAFFIDAVIT OF REFUSAL 
WITHIN SEVEN DA YS OF THE. SER VICE OF THE NOS FORM . . . . . . . . . . . .  5 
C. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE A WARDED ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS AND WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
DENYING KLING'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS . . . . . .  5 
III. ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
A. THE NOS FORM IS AMBIGUOUS AS APPLIED TO OUT-OF-STATE 
LICENSED DRIVERS AND VIOLATES THE STATUTE AND 
DUE PROCESS GUARANTEES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6 
B. THE MGISTRATE CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE POLICE OFFICER 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  FAILED TO TIMELY FILE HIS AFFIDAVIT OF REFUSAL 15 
. . . . . . . . . . . . .  C. KLINC; IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS .20  
IV. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
State Cases 
Ausman v . State. 124 Idaho 839. 864 P.2d 1126 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20 
Ater v . Idaho Bureau of Occupational Licenses. 144 Idaho 281. 160 P.3d 438 (2007) . . . . . .  20 
Averett v . City of Coeur d'Alene. 100 Idaho 751. 605 P.2d 515 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20 
Hansen v . State. 138 Idaho 865. 71 P.3d 464 (Ct . App . 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20 
Matter of Beern. 119 Idaho 289. 805 P.2d 495 (Ct . App . 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11. 15 
Matter ofBrink. 117 Idaho 55. 785 P.2d 619 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15 
Matter ofDrufe1. 136 Idaho 853. 41 P.3d739 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13.14.15. 21 
Matter of Griffths. 1 13 Idaho 364 744 P.2d 92 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12. 13 
Matter of Hansen. 12 1 Idaho 507. 826 P.2d 468 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17 
Matter of Virgil. 126 Idaho 946. 895 P.2d 182 (Ct . App . 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11. 15 
State Statutes and Rules 
Idaho Code 5 12-1 17(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20 
Idaho Code 5 12-121 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20 
Idaho Code 5 18-8002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  passim 
IMCR9.2(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7. 16 
I.R.C.P. 4(i) and 12(b)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16 
I.R.C.P.60 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16, 20 
I. STATEMINT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves the question as to whether the "NOS Form"' is ambiguous as applied 
to out-of-state licensed drivers who refuse to submit to evidentiary testing under Idaho Code 8 
18-8002. Since 1998, the Blaine County Magistrate Court has held that the NOS Form is 
ambiguous, violates a driver's due process rights, and fails to comply with I.C. §18-8002.2 For 
the first time in 12 years, the State now appeals that lineage of decisions. 
In this particular case, the Respondent, Matilda Kling's ("Kling") vehicle that she driving 
was stopped on December 8,2007 by a City of Sun Valley Police officer. On the night of this 
incident, a vigorous snow storm was covering the roads in Sun Valley with a blanket of snow 
when Kling was stopped for traveling approximately 10 miles per hour, in a 35 mph zone, as she 
proceeded west on ElWlorn Road towards Highway 75. According to his Probable Cause 
Affidavit, Officer Cunningham believed that Kling's vehicle was traveling westbound in the 
eastbound lane whereupon Officer Cunningham activated his overhead lights and made a motor 
vehicle stop on Kling's ~eh ic l e .~  
Kling was ultimately arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol in violation 
lThe "NOS Form" as referred to in this Respondent's Brief is the "NOTICE OF 
SUSPENSION for failure of evidentiary testing (advisory for Sections 18-8002 and 18-8002A, Idaho 
Code)", R., 9-10. 
2See, R., pp. 72 - 104 
3See, R., p. 57 
RESPONDENT'S BRTEF 
of Idaho Code § 18-8004 ("DUI") whereupon she was transported to the Sun Valley Police 
Department and requested to submit to a breath test to determine blood alcohol concentration. 
Kling ultimately refused to submit to the breath test. 
B. THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT AND ITS 
DISPOSITION 
Kling was issued an Idaho Uniform Citation for, in Violation #1 DUI, and in Violation #2 
she was actually charged with what purports to be a misdemeanor for "refusal to submit to 
evidentiary testing" in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8002(3) (hereinafter referred to as the "BAC 
Refu~al").~ Kling was also issued the NOS Form with a date of service on December 8,2007. 
However, Kling's Washington driver's license was not seized by the police officer nor were 
temporary driving privileges issued. 
On December 11,2007 Kling, through her attorney, timely filed a Special Notice of 
Appearance and Conditional Request for Hearing under Idaho Code 5 18-8002(4)(b).5 Once 
discovery was received from the State, Kling filed a Motion to Dismiss BAC Refusal Hearing 
dated January 2, 2008.6 
Kling's motion to dismiss the BAC refusal hearing was based upon two theories: (1) that 
the NOS Form violated Kling's due process rights as guaranteed by the U. S. and Idaho 
constitutions and violated case precedent decided by the Blaine County Magistrate Court on the 
basis that the NOS Form was ambiguous as applied to out-of-state licensed drivers; (2) that the 
4See, Defendant's Exhibit A; Tr., p. 5, L. 6. It is not a criminal offense to refuse to submit 
to a BAC test. 
5R., pp. 3-4 
6R., pp. 11-28 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
arresting officer failed to file an Affidavit of Refusal within seven days of the service of the NOS 
Form based upon prior Blaine County Magistrate Court precedent. 
Following the hearing on January 9,2008, the Magistrate Court dismissed the BAC 
refusal proceeding and made its ruling from the bench (for the trial court's reasoning, see Tr. pp. 
10-1 5) and issued a one page form order named Amended Order Dismissing Refusal Proceeding. 
R., p. 33. In a Notice of Appeal to the district court dated January 23, 2008 the State raised two 
issues, questioning whether the magistrate erred when it found that the NOS Form "did not 
provide adequate notice and due process to the defendant" and, secondly, whether the magistrate 
erred when it "[required] the State to file an Affidavit of Refusal within seven (7) days." 
The underlying DUX case was ultimately resolved when the State agreed to amend the 
charge to inattentive driving to which the Defendant pled guilty and was sentenced to suspended 
jail and fines and Court costs.7 
When no action was taken by the State for nearly eight months aRer filing its Notice of 
Appeal, Kling filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal which was denied by this Court.' When the 
State failed to file a Reply Brief, or set the matter for oral argument before the district court, after 
another 4 ?4 months, Kling again filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for failure to prosecute and, 
again, the motion was denied by the district court? The parties submitted the matter to the 
district court on the briefs and the district court affirmed the magi~trate.'~ However, the district 
'R., p. 58 
*R., pp. 44-45 
9R., pp. 121-125 
l0See, Order on Appeal, R., pp. 126-138 
RESPONDENT'S BREF 
court denied Kling's request for attorney's fees. The Parties timely appealed those rulings to this 
Court. 
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
With respect to the issues on appeal, most of the pertinent facts have already been recited 
in the previous paragraphs. In addition, as shown at R., p. 15, a copy of Kling's driver's license 
is depicted and was issued by the State of Washington. Kling gave her license to the arresting 
officer when he made initial contact with her at the scene of the stop. After her arrest, Kling was 
transported to the Sun Valley Police Department where the information contained in the NOS 
Form was played to Kling through an audio recording of the NOS Form. Kling ultimately 
refused the BAC test and, as noted on the NOS Form, her Washington driver's license was not 
seized nor was a permit issued for temporary driving privileges. 
Officer Cunni~igham's Probable Cause Affidavit in Support of Arrest Andor Refusal to 
Take Test was not filed with the court until December 18,2007. See, R., p. 127 where the district 
judge noted in his opinion that the affidavit was filed on said date. 
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II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ONAPPEAL 
A. WHETHER THE NOS FORM IS AMBIGUOUS AS APPLIED TO OUT-OF-STATE 
LICENSED DRIVERS AND VIOLATES THE STATUTE AND DUE PROCESS 
GUAM NTEES. 
B. WHETHER, ON A BAC REFUSAL PROCEEDING, THE ARRESTING OFFICER 
SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO FILE ANAFFIDAVIT OF REFUSAL WITHINSEVEN 
DAYS OF THE SERVICE OF THE NOS FORM 
C. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE A WARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
COSTS AND WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING KLING'S 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS. 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. THE NOS FORM IS AMBIGUOUS AS APPLIED TO OUT-OF-STATE LICENSED 
DRIVER, DOES NOT CONFORM TO THE STATUTE AND VIOLATES DUE PROCESS 
GUARANTEES. 
Under Idaho's Implied Consent Law ($18-8002), before a driver can be penalized for 
refusing to submit to evidentiary testing for alcohol concentration, the driver must be advised of 
the required information set forth in Idaho CodeH $ 18-8002(3). $ 18-8002 provides in relevant 
part that: 
(1) Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary testing 
for concentration of alcohol as defined in section 18-8004. Idaho Code, and 
to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for the presence of h i s  or 
other intoxicating substances, provided that such testing is administered at the 
- . A  - 
request of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that person 
has been driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation 
of the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, or section 18-8006, Idaho 
Code. 
(2) Such person shall not have the right to consult with an attorney before 
submitting to such evidentiary testing. 
(3) At the time evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol, or for the 
presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances is requested, the person 
shall be informed that ifhe refuses to submit to or if he fails to complete, 
evidentiary testing: 
(a) He is subject to a civil penalty of two hundred fifty dollars ($250) for 
refusing to take the test; 
(b) His driver's license will be seized by the peace officer anda temporary 
permit will be issued; provided, however, that no peace officer shall issue 
a temporary permit pursuant to this section to a driver whose driver's 
license or permit has already been and is suspended or revoked because of 
previous violations, and in no instance shall a temporary permit be issued 
llUnless otherwise noted, all references to statutory code sections will be Idaho statutes. 
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to a driver of a commercial vehicle who refuses to submit to or fails to 
complete an evidentiary test; 
(c) He has the right to request a hearing within seven (7) days to show 
cause why he refused to submit to, or complete evidentiary testing; 
(d) If he does not request a hearing or does not prevail at the hearing, his 
driver's license will be suspended absolutely for one year if this is his first 
refusal and two (2) years if this is his second refusal within ten (10) years; 
and 
(e) After submitting to evidentiary testing he may, when practicable, at his 
own expense, have additional tests made by a person of his own choosing. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Also, $ 18-8002(4)(a) provides that if the driver refuses to submit to BAC testing "his 
driver's license or permit shall be seized by the peace officer and forwarded to the court and a 
temporary permit shall be issued by the peace officer which allows him to operate a motor 
vehicle until the date of the hearing . . . ." (Emphasis added.) 
Under subsection (4)(b), if a person refuses, he must request a show-cause hearing within 
seven days or the driver suffers a one-year driver's license suspension and a $250 civil penalty. 
If a hearing is requested by the driver, then the burden of proof is on the "defendant" and the 
hearing is limited to the question of why the "defendant" did not submit to, or complete, 
evidentiary testing. 
According to subsection (5) of the statute, any "sustained civil penalty or suspension of 
driving privileges ... shall be a civil penalty separate and apart from any other suspension 
imposed for a violation of other Idaho motor vehicle codes or for a conviction of an offense 
pursuant to this chapter. . . ." A BAC Refusal Hearing under $18-8002 is a "civil hearing." See, 
IMCR 9.2(e). 
However, this language spelled out in $ 18-8002 is much different when compared to the 
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lkguage in the NOS Form. For example, under paragraph 4(B) on the NOS Form it reads: 
Your Idaho driver's license or permit will be seized if you have it in your 
possession, and if it is current and valid you will be issued a temporary permit. 
Nonresident licenses will not be seized and will be valid in Idaho for 30 days 
fiom the service of the Notice of Suspension unless modified or restricted by 
the court, provided the license is valid in the issuing state. If you were 
operating a commercial motor vehicle, any temporary permit issued will not 
provide commercial driving privileges of any kind. (Emphasis added.) 
However, in paragraphs 4(D) and (C), the advisory does not distinguish between an Idaho 
driver's license and nonresident licenses. 
Those paragraphs read: 
(C) You have the right to submit a written request within seven (7) days to the 
Magistrate Court of [Blaine] County to show cause why you refused to submit 
to or complete evidentiary testing and why your driver's license should not be 
suspended. 
(D) If you do not request a hearing or do not prevail at a hearing, the court will 
sustain the civil penalty and your license will be suspended with absolutely no 
driving privileges for one (1) year if this is your first refusal; and two (2) years 
if this is your second refusal with ten (10) years. 
Similar language is found in paragraph 5(a) of the NOS Form, with respect to taking and 
failing the test which does not track the language in $ 18-8002A. Neither statute makes a 
distinction between Idaho licensed drivers and nonresident licensed drivers. The statutes simply 
provide that the driver's license shall be seized by the peace officer and a temporary permit 
issued. The license seized by the arresting officer is to then be f o m d e d  to the court and a 
temporary permit shall be issued. 
To add to the matter, further confusing language is found toward the bottom of the NOS 
Form: "THIS SUSPENSION FOR FAILURE OR REFUSAL OF EVIDENTL4RY TEST@) 
IS SEPARATE FROM ANY OTHER SUSPENSION ORDERED BY THE COURT." 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
(Emphasis in capitals and bold, in original.) See, R., p. 9. That language fails to track $18- 
8002(5) and fails to impart to a driver, especially an nonresident, the different suspensions tha 
could be imposed in the civil area vis-a-vis the criminal action. 
Plus, in the bottom section of the NOS Form, it purports to provide " ... Temporary 
Driving Privileges" then, in parenthesis right below the bold heading, excepts out drivers of 
commercial vehicles, but not out-of-state licensed drivers. That section of the NOS Form goes 
on to read: 
If issued, this permit grants the same driving restrictions and privileges as those 
granted by the licenselpermit seized (except as indicated above),'' and shall be 
valid for thirty (30) days from the date you were served this Notice of Suspension 
for failure or refusal of the evidentiary test(s), unless it is canceled or restricted by 
the court. 
Then below the above quoted paragraph, the NOS Form indicates that a permit was 
issued; then crossed out, then the box is checked "No" and the license was not surrendered 
because the license was "Issued by Another Jurisdiction." Id. 
To put this issue into historical perspective in Blaine County, since 1998 then Blaine 
County Magistrate Court has ruled that the NOS Form was ambiguous and violated due process. 
Understandably, the magistrate in this case did not issue a written opinion analyzing the issue 
(see, R., p. 33, Amended Order Dismissing Refusal), nor was there much colloquy when the 
court made its ruling from the bench (see, Tr., p. 10, Ls. 8-15; pp. 13-14). 711~s it is helpful to 
understand the history of this matter when focusing on the magistrate's rational and order 
12Which above? The one indicated right above in parenthesis - that applies to drivers of 
commercial vehicles - or further above in paragraph 4(B) of the NOS Form. R., p. 9 
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dismissing the BAC Refusal proceedings. The Honorable Robert J.Elgee was the original 
magistrate to consider the issue and later became the Blaine County District Court Judge. See, 
the Order on Appeal affirming the magistrate decision to dismiss. See, R., pp. 126 - 138. 
The first case that was decided by then Blaine County Magistrate Judge Robert J. Elgee 
was State of Idaho v. Joseph M Stanton, Blaine County Case No. CR-98-8267, R., pp 72-74, 
where the court held that: 
The language of Idaho Code 5 18-8002(3) must be strictly adhered to. That 
language requires that the driver be told that "his driver's license will be 
seized." The statute does not distinguish between Idaho driver's licenses 
and out-of-state driver's licenses. The advisory form's statement that "Iwill 
seize your Idaho's driver's license" therefore does not strictly adhere to the 
language of the statute. 
In this instance, the section of the advisory form providing for temporary 
driving privileges reinforces the impression that the refusal will not dfect 
the driver's out-of-state driver's license or privileges by stating that the 
driver's license was not seized and a permit not issued because the license 
was issued by another state. 
See, R., p. 73 
Similar things happened in the Kling case. The NOS Form has a section that provides 
temporary driving privileges but it indicates that a permit was not issued, nor was her license 
surrendered, because it was "Issued by Another Jurisdiction." However, 5 18-8002(3) provides 
that not only would a person's driver's license be seized, but also that a temporary permit will be 
issued - again, not making a distinction between Idaho driver's licenses and nonresident driver's 
licenses. 
The next case considered by the Blaine County Magistrate was in the Matter of the 
Suspension of the Driver's License of Scott Anthony Moss, Blaine County Case No. CR-99-9247 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 10 
(SP-99-1873) filed January 7,2000, R., pp. 76-82. In Moss, the court adopted the reason and 
decision from Stanton and made this observation: 
Aside from being advised that a temporary permit cannot be issued to a driver 
operating a commercial vehicle or to a nonresident, there is nothing in the 
form to communicate to an out-ofstate driver that his license is suspended 
ifhe refises to take the test or fails the test. (Emphasis added.) 
See, R., p. 79 
Even with the minor modifications of the NOS Form that have occurred over the years, 
paragraph 4(B) of the NOS Form still provides that nonresident licenses will not be seized, and 
the form is not absolute in its directives to communicate to an out-of-state driver that his license 
will be suspended if he refuses. 
The Moss decision further provides: 
Accordingly, the Court draws two conclusions. First, that the form fails to 
follow the statutes enacted by the legislature, and second, the advisory form 
creates an unwarranted ambiguity with regard to out-of-state drivers by 
failing to advise them of the consequences of a refusal. Regarding the 
ambiguity, this is further reinforced by the bottom section of the form, where 
the form indicates that a permit was not issued, and that the defendant's 
license was not surrendered or taken by the police officer because it was 
"issued by another state." 
R., p. 79. 
As the magistrate observed in Moss, the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision issued in the 
Matter of Beem, 119 Idaho 289,805 P.2d 495 (Ct. App. 1991) requires that the information 
required by 5 18-8002 be set forth "in no uncertain terms." Also the Beem court emphasized that 
"Our Supreme Court has emphatically discountenanced interjection of judicial gloss upon the 
legislature's license suspension scheme." 
Four years later, the Idaho Court of Appeals again analyzed § 18-8002 and stated that 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
"Idaho law requires strict adherence" to the statutory language of Idaho Code 5 18-8002(3)." 
Matter of Virgil, 126 Idaho 946,895 P.2d 182 (Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added). 
The Moss decision concludes with this language: 
This court concludes that the provisions of the Advisory Form relating to the 
seizure of only Idaho licenses are ambiguous because the form could 
reasonably be interpreted to mean a refusal might or might not be applicable 
to out-of-state licenses. By telling a defendant in paragraph 4(C) that his 
"license will be suspended by the court if he does not request a hearing or 
does not win at the hearing," the form does not correct the other ambiguities 
created by the form. In short, the form does not clearly advise a nonresident 
defendant what is going to happen with his license or his driving privileges. 
R., pp. 80-81. 
In 2002, the Blaine County magistrate issued its order in Slate of Idaho v. Hansen, Blaine 
County Case No. SP-02-2808, which affirmed the Stanton and Moss decisions. R., pp. 85-89. 
Lastly, and to provide a full understanding of the magistrate's dismissal in the Kling 
matter, the current Blaine County Magistrate Judge issued its own order dismissing a BAC 
refusal case In the Matter of the Suspension of the Driver's License of Green, Blaine County 
Case No. CV-08-160, filed March 17,2008. In that case, the Blaine County magistrate 
considered the impact of the additional language put in paragraph 4(B) in the NOS Form which 
previously had only appeared in paragraph 5(A) of the form, to-wit: "Nonresident license will not 
be seized and will be valid in Idaho for 30 days . . . ." R., pp. 20-25. 
This additional language in paragraph 4(B) arguably confuses the matter further. While it 
states that nonresident licenses will not be seized and will remain valid in Idaho for 30 days, it 
does not indicate what happens after 30 days or what happens in the issuing state. 
Even though Blaine County magistrates have been ruling on this issue since 1998, the 
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matter has not been appealed by the State until this case. This Court is no stranger to reviewing 
ambiguities in the NOS form with the requirements of the statute. As first stated in the Matter of 
Gr i f f s ,  113 Idaho 364 744 P.2d 92 (1987): "[tlhe license of a driver who refuses to submit to a 
requested test will be reinstated if he can establish at the show cause hearing that he was not 
completely advised of his rights and duties under the statute." Id., 113 Idaho at 370,744 P.2d at 
98 (1987) (emphasis added). Not only does the NOS Form fail to technically and strictly comply 
with the statutory scheme in place at the time it was conveyed to Kling, but it was also 
misleading and completely incorrect such that the imposition of the license suspension would be 
"unjust or inequitable," to the use the language in GrifJiths. Id., 113 Idaho at 372,744 P.2d at 
100. 
The closest case on point from the Idaho Supreme Court, however, would foreclose any 
of the State's arguments. In the Matter ofDruffe1, 136 Idaho 853,41 P.3d 739 (2002) the Idaho 
Supreme Court reviewed an administrative license suspension ("ALS') ruling where the Idaho 
Transportation Department ("ITD") would not issue restricted driving privileges to nonresident 
drivers that suffered a license suspension under 3 18-8002A even though the statute said that 
restricted driving privileges would be issued. Druffel worked its way through the court system 
by way of a petition for judicial review that was pursued by ITD and the Idaho Supreme Court 
held that "ITD erred in refusing to allow the nonresident to apply for a restricted driving permit." 
136 Idaho at 854. The Idaho Supreme Court agreed with the district court that the ITD exceeded 
its statutory authority by prohibiting nonresidents from applying for restricted driving privileges 
when 3 18-8002A does specijcally allow restricted driving privileges. 
The Druffel case highlights the conflict that has been created by ITD where the statute 
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does not distinguish between resident and nonresident licenses but ITD, in its NOS Form, does: 
again, contrary to the mandates of the statute. The Idaho Supreme Court clearly held that ITD 
exceeded its authority when it chose to do that. 
The issue in Druffel revolved around whether a nonresident who was suspended under § 
18-8002A was entitled to restricted driving privileges. The statute provides that he was entitled 
to them, but ITD took the position that he was not. 
Druffel was a Washington resident but frequently drove in Idaho in the course of business 
and was arrested in Nez Perce County on June 6, 1999 for driving while under the influence of 
alcohol. He agreed to submit to an Intoxilyzer test, which he failed, and the officer issued and 
served a NOS Form on Druffel. As allowed by Idaho law, Druffet requested an ALS hearing and 
in his request for hearing Druffel alleged, inter alia, that the NOS Form was "deficient, vague, 
ambiguous and insufficient as to constitute proper notice as to what was expected, is to [sic] 
expected or could happen to an out-of-state driver as regards to the penalty/possibilities as a 
result of subscribing to the BAC test and blowing .08 or more." Id. at 854. The ALS hearing 
officer sustained the suspension apparently finding that the NOS Fonn complied with the statute. 
Druffel then filed a Petition for Judicial Review with the district court and the district 
court held that ITD had exceeded its statutory authority by disallowing restricted driving 
privileges to a nonresident. The district court set aside the administrative license suspension and 
ITD appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
On appeal, ITD argued that it had the power to decide who was eligible for restricted 
driving privileges on ALS suspensions and ITD even had a regulation that specifically stated that 
a nonresident was unable to apply for restricted driving privileges, clearly contrary to what the 
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statute says. In that regard, the Idaho Supreme Court held: 
The language ofI. C. 3 18-8002A(9) does not allow ITD to differentiate between 
a resident's and nonresident's ability to apply for restricted driving privileges. 
. . . The statute as a whole envisions the suspension of nonresident driving 
privileges. Nonresidents can apply for restricted driving privileges under I. C. 
18-8002A(9) so long as the nonresident applicant meets one of the 
circumstances listed in subsection (9). 
136 Idaho at 857. 
Even though Druffel was decided in 2002, the ambiguities and blatant inconsistencies 
between the statute and the NOS Form remain. Druffel implicitly holds that the NOS Form is 
ambiguous and a misstatement of the law when comparing the NOS Form to the statute. It 
therefore seems axiomatic when the Court considers Matter of Beem, supra, and Matter of Virgil, 
supra, - which requires "strict adherence" to the language of 3 18-8002 - that the magistrate is 
correct in ruling that the present edition of the NOS Form still violates the statute and the due 
process rights of nonresident drivers. Or as observed in the Matter ofBrink, 117 Idaho 55,785 
P.2d 619 (1990), the Idaho Supreme Court said: "Appellate courts do not have the authority to 
perform the type of open sentence surgery that the State requests." Id., 117 Idaho at 56. 
B. THE MAGISTRATE CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE POLICE OFFICER FAILED TO 
TIMELY FILE HIS AFFIDAVIT OF REFUSAL. 
The Court can dispose of this case by ruling that the NOS Form does not comply with the 
statute and the due process clauses of the Idaho and the United States constitutions. If the Court 
so rules, the Court does not have to reach the next issue on whether the State should be required 
to file an affidavit of refusal within 7 days of the service of the NOS Form. But even if the Court 
does, there is likewise long line of decisions issued by the Blaine County magistrates, that the 
police are required to timely file the affidavits of refusal within seven days after service of the 
NOS Form or seizure of the driver's license. 
It is true, and Kling concedes, that 3 18-8002 does not specifically indicate that a police 
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officer file his affidavit of refusal within seven days of the seizure of the  driver?^ license or 
service of the NOS Form. However, the police officer is required to file it with the court at some 
point. Also, Kling concedes that the statute does not specifically say that the time requirements 
for the police officer to file his affidavit start when the NOS Form is served: the triggering event 
under the statute is when the driver's license is seized. This highlights the confusion and 
ambiguity created by the State's failure to comply with 5 18-8002 through its NOS Form. The 
statute provides that "a driver's license will be seized by the peace officer and a temporary permit 
will be issued . . . ." However, as we have seen, for nonresident drivers, the police officer did not 
seize Kling's license but served a notice of suspension. It is from that event, under 3 18- 
8002(3)(c) that the driver has seven days to request a hearing for a show cause hearing.I3 
In Kling's case, the affidavit of refusal was filed on December 18,2007 but she was 
arrested on December 8,2007 and served the NOS Form on that day. The affidavit of refusal, if 
one applies a seven-day requirement, was required to be filed no later than December 17,2007. 
See, IRCP 6(a). 
On December 1 1,2007, Kling timely filed her Special Notice of Appearance and 
Conditional Request for Hearing which was filed under I.R.C.P. 4(i) and 12(b)(2). See, IMCR 
9.2(e) which provides that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply to a BAC Refusal hearing 
except for certain exceptions not applicable here. Kling's Special Notice of Appearance 
specifically indicated that "[tlhis request is conditioned upon the arresting officer timely 
13Also, under 3 18-8002(4)(b) it states that a "written request may be made wiihin seven (7) 
calendar days for a hearing before the court; if requested, the hearing must be held within thirty (30) 
days of the seizure unless the period is . . ." Thus, under this subsection, the triggering event is the 
"seizure" of the driver's license but what happens if the driver's license is not seized? If not seized, 
does the court have to have a show cause hearing within 30 days? If so, 30 days from what? 
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submitting an affidavit of refusal and in the event the arresting officer fails to timely submit said 
affidavit of refusal, the Petitioner requests that this matter be dismissed." 
I.R.C.P. 4 sets forth how a party may make a general appearance or a special appearance. 
Under I.R.C.P. 4(i)(2) a party may make special appearance in a civil proceeding and as Kling 
did reserved the right to object to the arresting officer's failure to comply with the rules and 
statutes that deal with filing an affidavit of refusal and issues of "insufficiency of process" or 
"failure to state a claim" under I.R.C.P. 12(b). These rules allowed Kling to make a special 
appearance in the matter to contest the timeliness of the filing of the officer's affidavit. 
This Special Notice of Appearance employed by Kling, made Mutter ofHunsen, 121 
Idaho 507, 826 P.2d 468 (1992) "inapposite" as that word was used by the Blaine County 
magistrate. See, R., p. 115. In Hansen, not cited by the Appellant, the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that once a request for a BAC Refusal hearing is made by the driver, then there is no need to file 
an affidavit of refusal. The issue in Hunsen was a matter of jurisdiction and the Court held that 
the was not a condition precedent to confer jurisdiction to the court. Here, however, the 
Kling case was not decided on jurisdictional grounds but more in line with the effective 
administration of the court's business and the inherent timeliness of these type of proceedings as 
evidenced by the legislature's specific time limits set forth in 85 18-8002 and 18-8002A; or to use 
the magistrate's words "what is good for the goose is good for the gander, i.e., if the Defendant 
has a seven day time limit, the State should have the same time limit." R., p 27. Counsel for 
Kling drafted the Special Notice of Appearance and Conditional Request for Hearing in specific 
response to Hansen. 
5 18-8002(4)(c) does state that the court must receive a sworn statement (the affidavit of 
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refusal) indicating the circumstances of the refusal before it can suspend driving privileges of a 
person who has not requested a hearing. Additionally, Idaho Misdemeanor Criminal Rule 
9.2(a)(l) provides that: "The court shall not accept a license seized under Section 18-8002, Idaho 
Code, without an accompanying affidavit. . . ." 
The rationale and the basis on the lineage of Blaine County decisions dismissing the BAC 
Refusal hearings where the police officer failed to file an affidavit of refusal within seven days 
from the incident, is based upon a recognition of the court's insistence that these matters be 
processed in a timely fashion and under the "effective administration of the Court's business." 
See, R., p. 119. 
An Ada County magistrate who considered this issue found that the seven-day time 
requirement could be implied when $5 18-8002 and 18-8002A were considered inpari materia 
where the latter statute required that the police officer submit documents to ITD within five days 
of the service of the NOS Form while under that same statute, the driver had seven days to 
request a hearing. Judge Sellman's Memorandum Decision and Order is set forth at R., pp. 105- 
108, State of Idaho v. Mark Pasta, Ada County Case No. M-05-04307. Judge Sellman wrote: 
Nevertheless, there is a limitation implicit in 5 18-8002 that requires that said 
affidavit must be filed within the same seven-day time l i t  imposed on the 
driver. As Judge Elgee, formerly magistrate and now district judge in Blaine 
County in the Fifth District, stated, in several opinions, one of the court's 
duties is to ensure the effective administration of justice. The failure of an 
officer to submit an affidavit within the seven-day period set forth in Idaho 
Code 3 18-8002 affects the court's ability to set a timely hearing. Any delay 
by the officer in submitting the affidavit presents the problem of conducting a 
hearing within a shortened period of time. 
See, R., p. 107. 
Also, the current Blaine County Magistrate in other decisions, has adopted the seven-day 
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time requirement for filing an affidavit of refusal based upon the precedents established by this 
its predecessor and current Blaine County District Court Judge. For example, see R., pp. 26-28, 
attached to Kling's Motion to Dismiss entitled State of Idaho v. Brian Watts, Blaine County Case 
No. CR-05-769. There the magistrate also noticed the symmetry between Idaho Code $ 5  18- 
8002 and 18-8002A where the latter statute requires affidavits filed within five days.14 The 
magistrate also alertly noticed that I.R.C.P. 6(c)(2) requires an affidavit for verified complaint 
before a court can issue an order to show cause in any civil action. A BAC refusal hearing is, 
under the language of the statute, a show cause hearing and is a civil proceeding. 
Another keen observation by the magistrate is what happens in the situation where the 
driver refuses, never requests a hearing and the police never submit an affidavit which would 
cause no suspension of the defendant's driving privileges "even though that possibility exists ad 
injnit~rn."~ 
The Blaine County Magistrate also observed in the next paragraph that "If there is not a 
time limit on when the affidavit can be filed, a person could file a timely request for a hearing 
and then be required to show cause when there is no evidentiary basis to believe that he refused." 
R., p. 18. Those types of situations in fact occurred in Blaine County. 
For example, see R., 110-1 12, Matter of Haney, Blaine County Case No. SP-98-1637, 
where the arresting officer failed to file an affidavit of refusal and forward the petitioner's 
driver's license with the Court. See, also, R., pp. 1 14-1 16, Matter of Powers, Blaine County 
Case No. SP-03-3218, where the arresting officer failed to file an affidavit of refusal. See, also, 
R., pp. 117-120, In the Matter of Burke, Blaine County Case No. CR 00-10242, where the driver 
was arrested on December 3 1, 1999 and it was alleged that she refused to submit to a BAC test 
whereupon she timely filed a Special Notice of Appearance and Conditional Request for Hearing. 
The matter was set for a show-cause hearing on January 19,2000 and still, at that point, the 
arresting officer's citation, affidavit of refusal and NOS Form had not been filed with the court. 
Then, in subsequent decisions, the beam began to focus and narrow in to where, even if 
14See, R., Footnote 3 in State v. Watts. 
I5See, R., p., 18, State v. Watts. 
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the affidavit of refusal was filed within 8 to 11 days after the incident and the court was 
dismissing BAC refusal hearings. As illustrated in State v. Watts, R., pp. 26-28, the affidavit of 
refusal was filed one day late and the Blaine County magistrate nevertheless dismissed for being 
untimely. 
Accordingly, if the' Court determines that it must address this issue, Kling urges the Court 
to follow the rationale and policy considerations established through the case law decided in 
Blaine County in that affidavits of refusal need to be filed within seven days of the incident or 
they are untimely and can provide a basis to dismiss BAC Refusal hearings. Consider what 
happens when the roles are reversed when the driver fails to request a hearing within 7 days: it is 
a "ministerial" act to enter an order suspending driving privileges for one year. No relief under 
IRCP 60(b) for such grounds as excusable neglect or mistake by the driver's attorney. Ausman v. 
State, 124 Idaho 839, 864 P.2d 1126 (1993); Hansen v. State, 138 Idaho 865,71 P.3d 464 
(Ct.App. 2003)(rev. denied, June 2003). 
C. KLlNG IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule (IAR) 41 and IAR 35(b)(5), Kling requests that she be 
awarded her attorney's fees and costs incurred in this appeal and that the district court's decision 
denying Kling's request for attorney's fees and costs, be reversed. The basis for the request for 
attorney's fees is authorized by IRCP 54(e)(l) and $12-1 17(1), 12-121. Attorney's fees and costs 
may be assessed against the State under $ 12-121. Averett v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 100 Idaho 
751,605 P.2d 515 (1980). Attorney's fees may be awarded against the State pursuant to $12- 
117(1). Ater v. Idaho Bureau ofOccupational Licenses, 144 Idaho 281, 160 P.3d 438 (2007). 
The district court erred when it found that no state agency was a party to this proceeding 
as, under the terms of $12-1 17(1), it applies to a "civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse 
parties a state agency or political subdivision ...." This proceeding was originally initiated by the 
police officer when he charged Kling in the Sun Valley Police Department Uniform Citation filed 
in this matter with Refusal to Submit to Evidentiary Testing, citing $18-8002(3). See, 
Defendant's Exhibit A. The City of Sun Valley Police Department is a political subdivision 
under 12-1 17(1). The prosecution in this matter - both the DUI and BAC Refusal - were 
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assumed from the political subdivision by the State. 
In her Special Notice of Appearance the case heading was named Kling as the Petitioner 
and the State of Idaho as the Respondent. Before this Court the "State of Idaho" is the 
Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Respondent. Certainly the State is a party to this action and the district 
court also erred when it found that §§12-117(1) and 12-121 did not apply. 
Under 5 12-1 17(1) Kling would be the prevailing party and under 3 12-121 this Court can 
find that the State's actions in this matter were pursued and defended frivolously, unreasonably 
or without foundation. Especially when one considers that Druffel was decided in 2002 and 
noted that ITD did not have the authority to differentiate between resident and nonresident 
drivers when drafting the NOS Form. Notwithstanding that, another five years went by before 
Kling was charged with a BAC Refusal and the NOS Form was basically unchanged from the 
time of Druffel. 
IV: CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Kling respectfully requests that the magistrate's order be 
affirmed and that the district court's decision denying Kling her attorney's fees and costs, be 
reversed and that she be awarded her attorney's fees and costs. 
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